Bradley Smith said in his post this week—“…corruption follows power, and given the scope and power of the federal government, it’s simply inevitable that there will always be scandals. No amount of regulation will insulate us from the reality that some public servants succumb to temptation.”

In my opinion, this very perception is what necessitates a voluntary alternative to our current monied system.

The fact of the matter is that Members of Congress make decisions that impact the special interests that help them raise the money they need to enter, and to remain, in office.

As long as our current big donor focused system remains the only fundraising alternative for a viable campaign, fingers will be pointed; and the press and public will assume the money politicians take from corporations and lobbyists is influencing their choices.

Yes, it is true that some will always choose corruption and scandal will ensue—however, while all politicians have no recourse but to enter this corrosive system, which fosters the perception (and sometimes the reality) of corruption, all our officials are constantly called into question.

In order to have true reform we need the public financing system which I spoke of last week and others have mentioned in this week’s posts. A voluntary system of public financing would allow politicians the option of financing their campaign from small donors, from their constituents—rather than forcing them to rely on special interests which have a vested stake in their decisions. In this way, lobbyists in addition to any other large donor or bundler, will be equal in influence to the small donor constituent back home. This is the game-changer policy, and we need to give politicians this option.

Even after a number of efforts over many years, our system still needs reform. But the issues of whether a lobbyist can pay for dinner, host a party or bundle campaign contributions are distractions from the greater issue of money in politics. Take a look at the top 100 donors to each party, you will only find a handful of lobbyists and that’s not until you get out of the top 50. The issue is not who is giving the money, so instead of trying to limit the Constitutional rights of someone just because he or she is an experienced professional who happens to be a registered lobbyist, we need to step back and really get to the heart of the problem.

As I noted last week, public financing of our federal elections will go a long way to clearing the air in Washington. And according to a recent survey by Americans for Campaign Reform, voters are ready for this change and I would safely bet so are my former colleagues.

The national survey found every major demographic group solidly favored a public financing bill that was introduced last year by Sen. Dick Durbin. It found incredible support across party lines – 69% of Democrats, 64% of Republicans, and 66% of independents. In addition, there’s virtually no difference across regional lines.

The survey also found 4 out of 5 voters (81%) polled believe we need to change the way elections are financed, including a majority (54%) who call for “major” changes. Nearly three out of five voters (57%) believe that our campaign finance system is getting worse with 28% who think it’s staying the same. Only 5% think it is improving.

Public financing of campaings is important, but for it to work we must reduce the cost of campaigns. One of the ways to do that is by returning the public airwaves back to the people. Additionally, any measure must provide an easily understandable equation for candidates to qualify and receive public dollars in a transparent way.

Eliminating leadership PACs is another needed reform. These PACS are part of the engine that continues to drive this massive campaign fundraising machine and violates the spirit of McCain/Feingold.

Too often reform is Washington focusses on changes at the margins that garner headlines but leave the core problems with the system in place. Bans on buying meals, or restricting contributions from a select group of people won’t bring the change we need. That will require much larger, and more substantive reforms.

Of course we should. After all, who really believes that lobbyists have constitutional rights? At a minimum, we should force them to choose between exercising their First Amendment right to petition the government for redress, and exercising their First Amendment rights of speech and association.

Besides, it’s not like the law isn’t complex enough already. At this point, the Federal Election Campaign Act only imposes rules on 71 distinct entities, from individuals to local party committees to independent organizations to unions to “qualified non-corporations (“MCFLS”)” to LLCs and, well, 65 more. FEC regulations span over 500 pages and over 1,200 pages of the Federal Register are devoted to explanations and justifications of those regulations.

Time for the intrusion of real life. One of the many unfortunate results of “reform” is the way it has distorted the funding process. (By the way, does it ever occur to anyone that we’ve been trying this top down, regulatory approach for over a century now – 35 years since the FECA was passed, if you want to start there – and the problem never gets better, despite all the promises of the “reform community?”) There was a time when, once you decided to run for office, you found some people who agreed with you on issues, and they gave you money, and raised more from their friends. But the ever increasing complexity of the law, and the need to raise funds in small amounts, has made this old system pretty much impossible. (Some have analogized raising money under the current contribution limits, which were too low when the law was drafted in 1974 and are now a fraction of that amount in inflation adjusted terms, to trying to fill a swimming pool with a teaspoon.) This has, in turn created the professional donor/fundraiser class. It is not that lobbyists use campaign contributions to buy influence, but rather, but that lawmakers seek lobbyist cash in a sort of extortion racket – “I won’t meet with you if you don’t provide cash.” It is, of course, illegal for a lobbying firm or its clients to reimburse a lobbyist (or anyone else) for a donation, so lobbyists are simply given an income that is sufficient to allow them to make the requested contributions.

If the Obama administration and Congress were interested in muting the influence of lobbyists, a more effective reform would be to raise or eliminate or substantially raise the $2,400 federal individual contribution limit, as well as the aggregate giving limits and the limits on PAC contributions, which haven’t been raised since 1974. As it stands, candidates must raise hundreds of contributions from a wide array of individuals and interests. Without an arbitrary contribution limit, candidates could rely less on PACs and lobbyists and leave it up to their constituents to decide whether their campaign funding is proper.

It is also important to remember that what a candidate can do with lobbyist (or any) campaign cash is very limited. The “personal use doctrine,” which prohibits using campaign funds for personal items, already offers protection against quid pro quo dealing in campaign contributions: donations must be used for political campaigning, not for personal enrichment of the politician. (An aside – during my time at the FEC, I consistently argued for strict interpretations of this rule. The “reform community” was absolutely zero help on the issue, I can only assume because they feared that strict interpretation of the personal use rule would hurt the relationships their lobbyists had with certain prominent, pro-“reform” legislators.) Thus, a politician can’t use a lobbyist’s contribution to the campaign to buy a watch, or a car, or a fur coat for his spouse, etc. He can use it to buy buttons and TV ads and the like, and that’s it. The scandals the reform community likes to point to all involved illegal personal enrichment – William Jefferson, Bob Ney, Duke Cunningham, and the like were all engaged in taking bribes for personal use.

As the Supreme Court has recognized, campaign contributions are a form of protected First Amendment activity: protected speech and association of both the candidate and contributor. Congress should tread lightly in prohibiting and entire class of people, registered lobbyists, from exercising that right.

Constitutional questions aside, the policy of banning lobbyists from donating to federal campaigns is unlikely to have any positive effect on campaign or government ethics. The overwhelming majority of serious studies show that contributions do not impact legislative votes. Party identification, constituent opinion and other factors are much more salient.

The practice of scape-goating lobbyists for all that ails Washington (en vogue with the Obama administration and their enablers in the “reform” community) is reaching a tipping point. Not every mini-scandal is an example of why we need to ratchet up campaign finance regulation, yet “reformers” have openly admitted that they plan to use every two-bit scandal to hammer away at the need for additional layers of campaign finance restrictions.

What sense does it make to say that if lobbyist A gives a Senator a campaign contribution, and meets with the Senator, it is corrupting, but if company executive B, interest group activist C, or non-lobbyist Washington lawyer D make the same contribution, and then meet with the Senator, it’s no problem?

What reformers refuse to face – in part because most reformers favor bigger government – is that corruption follows power, and given the scope and power of the federal government, it’s simply inevitable that there will always be scandals. No amount of regulation will insulate us from the reality that some public servants succumb to temptation.

Prohibiting lobbyists from donating to campaigns would just add more pages of campaign finance regulations without offering any tangible improvement in government.

Exiling lobbyists from the political process would likely generate a tremendous wave of public support, and even after the litigation was resolved in the lobby's favor, it would still be a fan favorite. It would, in other words, feel good but solve nothing and while that is sometimes the definition of good government in Washington we'd be back to square one.

This question points to the real fundamental issue. While it is true that everyone should have the right to a voice in the political process, as a country we have to decide whether greater wealth and greater access means you have greater rights. Right now that is de facto U.S. policy. Public financing would go a long way toward changing that.

Obviously, the best way to fix the campaign finance system is to enact effective, well-designed public financing systems that eliminate large, influence-buying contributions from any source. Fixing the presidential public financing system would not be hard from a substantive point of view. What makes it hard is the longstanding lack of political will from both the White House and Congress. Enacting a congressional system of publicly financed campaigns should be a priority for this Congress, but so far the critical mass (i.e., a majority vote) has not been reached as incumbents from both parties are -- as usual -- resistant.

Looking past public financing at more incremental steps, it is important to note at the outset that any policy that focuses solely on lobbyists will be flawed because the pay-to-play system extends beyond lobbyists. That being said, there are some steps that can be taken that would pass constitutional muster because there exists a nexus between efforts to use funds to influence Congress and the Executive Branch, and the strong governmental interest in blocking corruption and the appearance of corruption.

First and foremost is dealing with bundling which is the mechanism through which the most dangerous influence-money comes into the system. While protecting their First Amendment rights to express support for candidates and to encourage donations, lobbyists could be banned from directing, receiving, or arranging contributions from others. Also, banning lobbyists from hosting fundraisers and from serving on political action committee boards are worthwhile ideas that should be considered. It’s also worth looking at links between earmarks and contributors. When a lawmaker earmarks taxpayer dollars that benefit a particular campaign contributor, such a link creates an obvious appearance of political corruption. But it is important to establish and describe the nexus because any total ban on political contributions by lobbyists will have a higher standard to meet than a reduced contribution limit and will require direct linkage to the danger of corruption to pass muster with the current Supreme Court.

Since non-lobbyists bundle as well, one possibility is to allow non-lobbyists to solicit, direct or transfer contributions from others, but to require those contributions to either count against their current contribution limits or to establish a new, fairly low aggregate limit for bundled contributions.

It is worth noting that the Federal Election Commission (FEC) undermined the bundling provisions that were contained in the Honest Leadership and Open Government Act (HLOGA) so as to make the requirements contained in the law unrecognizable and in direct contradiction to the expressed purpose elucidated by then-Senator Obama and Senator Feingold, the two primary champions of the provision.

And no attempt to curb the pay-to-play system in Washington can be complete without real reforms to the implementation and enforcement of the laws passed by Congress. An FEC made up of party loyalists has rarely exhibited the fortitude to properly enforce the laws passed by Congress that are unpopular with Party elders.

When campaign finance once was on the Senate Floor, I half-jokingly urged Senator Nickles to offer an amendment to ban campaign contributions from registered lobbyists. I told him he would receive an explosion of support. Unfortunately, he did offer such an amendment (at a time when most folks were out of town), but of course it wasn't offered seriously, nor should it have been. I might flippantly suggest that I'm prepared to surrender a constitutional right, but in the final analysis I enjoy exercising my right to support people and policies in which I believe. I do not regard doing so as an obligation, but as a privilege.

If registered lobbyists were denied the right to support candidates, yet another incentive to de-register could be created, which will result in a reduction in public disclosure and transparency.